Islamic Conquests Up To 700 A.d. – Islamic Strengths / Roman Weaknesses? Essay, Research Paper
In the two decades after the
Byzantine occupation of Ctesiphon in 629 the newly formed Islamic state had
destroyed the Sasaninan Empire whilst severely damaged the Byzantine
Empire.? These gains were by no means
temporary.? Indeed our period sees the
strengthening and expansion of these gains into northern Africa and the
Mediterranean Islands. Yet, before Muhammad?s extraordinary rise to power there
had been no Islamic state at all.? In a
little over a decade Muhammad and his followers had converted a raft of
separate and nomadic tribes into a state capable of defeating both the region?s
great powers.? This conquest was as
unexpected as it was remarkable.? I will
attempt to highlight both the Arabian strengths and the Byzantine and Persian
weaknesses before examining their relative importance. The Arabs strength was primarily
based on their unity.? Whilst nomadic
warriors were mobile and effective, they had previously lacked the unity of
purpose and unity of action to pose a serious threat to either of the great
powers.? These nomadic tribes were more
likely to raid the great powers in a snatch and grab fashion. For this reason
neither empire devoted significant resources to the defence against the
Arabs.? Instead Arabian allies, like the
Ghassnids and the Lakhmids, were employed to keep the nomads in check.? In hindsight it is clear that if harnessed
correctly these nomadic tribes, and their sedentary and tribal brothers, could
provide an imposing and effective force.?
It was Muhammad and most significantly the new religion of Islam that
finally harnessed this power. It is important to note that Muhammad?s Islamic
state did not destroy the tribal system that underpinned Arabian life.? Instead, we should see the Islamic state as
a ?supra-tribe?.? Muhammad and Abu Bakr
utilised the strong control that tribal leaders could exert over their kinsmen
by associating a tribal leader with the state.?
The status of the leader and the status of the state were inextricably
linked.? Thus the Islamic state?s
leaders could rely on tribal leader?s to organise and control their own
tribesmen.? Therefore we see the Islamic
state, not as a mass of homogenous Muslims, but a series of tribes linked by
Islam and a common acceptance, at least in the early stages, of centralised
authority.? Significantly the nature of Islam
itself aided the development of social and political unity.? The umma, or community of believers, was
based on principles that encouraged not only political and social cohesion but
expansion. The monotheistic nature of Islam consciously implied the need to
expand.? Muslims were taught that the
House of Islam and the House of War were separate.? The people of the world could be sharply divided into Muslims and
non-Muslims, and as the Qu?ran says ?There is no God but God?.? By implying the universal and unique nature
of god, and the overriding moral authority of God, Islam provided the impetus
for political unification and centralisation.?
As Muhammad was God?s presence on earth it is easy to see how he was
associated with power.? His perceived
relationship with God aided the construction of a legal system less reliant on
blood feuds and retaliation, as well as legitimising centralised taxation and
control.? Once Islam and the Islamic
state?s power had been created and legitimised successive leaders furthered
centralisation and control.? Sedentary
tribes were given precedence over nomadic ones.? Indeed Nomadism was frowned upon by the Islamic state.? By emphasising the dominance of the
sedentary tribes around Medina, notably the muharijun and the Quraysh, the
state associated power with sedentary, centralised tribes.? Further actions show a desire for the nomads
to settle.? Upon conquest individuals
were only permitted to receive the lucrative ata, or stipend, if they settled:
?the sooner one settles, the sooner one receives the stipend?.? This desire for settlement can surely be
seen as a form of control.? By
encouraging settlement the central authorities encouraged further control.The centralised administrative
structure enabled the Islamic state to organise and fund the conquests.? Traditionally historians viewed the Islamic
conquests as economically driven migrations, but evidence points to a more
organised and strategic movement.? The
first settlers or soldiers that had conquered territories did not bring women,
children and animals with them.? This
implies a stage-by-stage approach to conquest: overpower the occupiers and then
allow controlled migration.? The
interpretation that the Islamic conquests were a collection of random and
eclectic raids is also questionable.? It
can be persuasively argued that the conquests were centrally controlled.? The best example of central directive
authority is Umar?s decision to switch the great Khalid from the Iraqi frontier
to the Syrian frontier.? Donner furthers
these arguments by suggesting that the state had the power to tax and recruit
from all tribes via state run agents.?
He argues that Umar formed conquest parties by instructing his network
of agents to contribute recruits to the Islamic cause.? No historian seems to suggest that the
Muslims had any technological superiority over the great power, and in most
cases they were numerically outnumbered.?
It has been suggested that there were more Arabs fighting for the
Byzantines than there were for the Muslims at Yarmuk.? Similarly, at the decisive battle of Qadisiyya, the Persians,
under the command of Rustam, were numerically superior to the Arabs.? Evidence is sparse and unreliable, but the
way in which the Muslims consistently defeated both empires suggests that in
military terms they must have had some advantage.? Whether this advantage was due to intelligent strategy, religious
fanaticism, a crop of talented generals or better communications is in some
ways irrelevant.? It would be extremely
hard not to suggest that the Arabs had some kind of military advantage.The Byzantine entry into
Ctesiphon in 628 is a false indicator of Byzantine strength.? The Persians were suffering from a series of
internal crisis?s and the Byzantines ultimate victory was largely a result of
Turkish assistance.? Most significantly
the entry into Ctesiphon was the culmination of two decades of damaging warfare
with the Persians.? It was remarkable
that Heraclius managed to raise the necessary resources to launch his
counter-offensive against the Turks.? At
the time the Persians occupied large parts of Palestine and Syria and the imperial
authorities faced a financial crisis.?
The melting down of bronze statues and the removal of plate from
churches highlight the financial plight of the empire.? Similarly the need for Turkish allies shows
us the severe recruitment crisis faced by Heraclius.? Heraclius? remarkable comeback was achieved at a cost.? Generations of civilians in Syria and
Palestine had grown up without imperial rule.?
The populations of these important border lands were alienated from the
empie.? The religious divisions that
plagued the near east can only have intensified this alienation.? Whilst we must not suggest that the division
between Monophytism and imperial orthodoxy encouraged active resistance to the
Byzantines, it cannot have encouraged passionate resistance to Muslim
invaders.? In Egypt however the
religious divisions were more pronounced.?
These divisions, which were inextricably linked with cultural divisions,
created a popular attitude that was ambivalent at best to Byzantine rule.? The situation in Egypt was not helped by the
appointment of the militantly orthodox Cyrus as governor.? The war with Persia had economic and
political effects.? The Byzantines
needed time to recover administrative control over its peoples, as well as time
to recover the economic and military resources that were so depleted during the
Persian wars.Again the lack of evidence makes
it difficult for us to ascertain the precise reasons for Byzantine military
failure, but the apparently large number of Arabs in the Byzantine army shows
us of the recruitment problem.? The
surprise element of the Muslim conquests exemplifies certain Byzantine
weaknesses.? The Byzantines lacked the
intelligence gathering sources to recognise the threat from the Muslims and as
a result had to fight on the Muslim?s terms. In previous wars the Byzantines
used attritional methods to defeat their enemies, but as the disastrous defeat
at Yarmuk suggests the significant early conflicts were large battles.? The Byzantine defences, in relation to the
Arabian desert, were clearly inadequate.?
Much responsibility for the maintenance of city walls was given to city
dwellers, perhaps symptomatic of a lack of imperial control. Residents of the
frontier cities were only too keen to make peace with the Muslims.? It is debatable whether this was due to
cultural and religious differences with the imperial authorities, or to a
rational and pragmatic belief that Muslim rule was the most advantageous way
forward.? Some historians suggest that
the defence in depth policy that necessitated the self-protection of cities
played into the hands of the Muslims.?
The strategy of leaving the elite and mobile forces behind the frontier
was tantamount to letting the Muslims invade the border-lands.? However, it can also be argued that this
policy was also the saviour of the empire.?
These mobile forces were able to restrict the Muslims behind the
Anatolian plateau and thus protect Constantinople. Again the viability of this
argument is largely irrelevant.? The
Roman Empire lacked the resources; the strategy and the military might to
defeat the Muslims.? The dearth of men,
money and close-knit administration was primarily the result of the sapping
Persian war, as well as the cultural and religious divisions that beset the
empire in the 7th century.The Byzantine Empire, in part at
least, survived the 7th century, but by the middle of the 7th
century the Sasanian Empire had been totally destroyed.? The Sasanian Empire had of course
experienced the same debilitating effects of war that the Byzantine Empire
had.? Thus we can say that both empires
were stretched in terms of resources, as well as psychologically
war-weary.? Short-term problems also
afflicted the Sasanians with the floods and plagues of the early to mid 7th
century being the prime examples.? More
long term, structural weaknesses were exposed as a result of the Byzantine
war.? The dynastic rule of the Sasanian
house caused problems in terms of succession.?
It was difficult for new rulers to gain the credibility and respect that
was needed to maintain the support of the independently minded
aristocracy.? The ten different Sasanian
Kings between 628 and 632 bear testament to this problem.? Internal struggles, as in the Roman Empire,
plagued the Sasanian Empire.? Bloody
fights for succession and the Madzakite revolutions of the 5th and 6th
centuries are indicative of an empire with severe political and social
problems.? Again, there is little in the
way of military evidence to explain the chronic poor performance of the
Sasanians.? We can point to lack of
resources and war exhaustion, but at the decisive battle of Qadisiyya Rustam
had a significantly larger force under his command than his Muslim
counterpart.? The loss of this key
battle and the subsequent loss of the capital Ctesiphon highlight another
weakness.? The location of Ctesiphon,
without the protection of strong enough natural or man-made barriers, hastened
the decline of the empire.? The Sasanian
empire, with Ctesiphon acting as a fulcrum for political, military and
administrative activity, survived the death of Peroz in 484 at the hands of the
Hepthalites and the Roman invasion of 627-8, but without Ctesiphon it stood no
chance of defending itself from the Muslims.It is clear than Sasanian and
Roman weaknesses played a significant role in the success of the Islamic
conquests.? Both empires were slowly
recovering from a long and damaging war and we can say with some certainty that
their military status was perilous.?
Both empires were ill-prepared for an attack from the Muslims and as was
often the case in this period the external pressures of the 7th
century intensified existing internal problems.? It would be wrong however to underplay Arab strengths.? The unity of purpose and organizational
power of the Islamic state was remarkable.?
In less than 40 years Muhammad and his successors under the umbrella of
Islam had created a centralised Arabian state capable of defeating both
powers.? The strength of Islam in
creating the state and in providing the ideological underpinning for centralisation
and expansion was extremely significant.?
It is for these reasons that I believe that Arab strengths were more
important than Roman and Persian weaknesses.?
Yes, the position of the great powers was perilous, but the phenomenal
rise of the Islamic state
Byzantine occupation of Ctesiphon in 629 the newly formed Islamic state had
destroyed the Sasaninan Empire whilst severely damaged the Byzantine
Empire.? These gains were by no means
temporary.? Indeed our period sees the
strengthening and expansion of these gains into northern Africa and the
Mediterranean Islands. Yet, before Muhammad?s extraordinary rise to power there
had been no Islamic state at all.? In a
little over a decade Muhammad and his followers had converted a raft of
separate and nomadic tribes into a state capable of defeating both the region?s
great powers.? This conquest was as
unexpected as it was remarkable.? I will
attempt to highlight both the Arabian strengths and the Byzantine and Persian
weaknesses before examining their relative importance. The Arabs strength was primarily
based on their unity.? Whilst nomadic
warriors were mobile and effective, they had previously lacked the unity of
purpose and unity of action to pose a serious threat to either of the great
powers.? These nomadic tribes were more
likely to raid the great powers in a snatch and grab fashion. For this reason
neither empire devoted significant resources to the defence against the
Arabs.? Instead Arabian allies, like the
Ghassnids and the Lakhmids, were employed to keep the nomads in check.? In hindsight it is clear that if harnessed
correctly these nomadic tribes, and their sedentary and tribal brothers, could
provide an imposing and effective force.?
It was Muhammad and most significantly the new religion of Islam that
finally harnessed this power. It is important to note that Muhammad?s Islamic
state did not destroy the tribal system that underpinned Arabian life.? Instead, we should see the Islamic state as
a ?supra-tribe?.? Muhammad and Abu Bakr
utilised the strong control that tribal leaders could exert over their kinsmen
by associating a tribal leader with the state.?
The status of the leader and the status of the state were inextricably
linked.? Thus the Islamic state?s
leaders could rely on tribal leader?s to organise and control their own
tribesmen.? Therefore we see the Islamic
state, not as a mass of homogenous Muslims, but a series of tribes linked by
Islam and a common acceptance, at least in the early stages, of centralised
authority.? Significantly the nature of Islam
itself aided the development of social and political unity.? The umma, or community of believers, was
based on principles that encouraged not only political and social cohesion but
expansion. The monotheistic nature of Islam consciously implied the need to
expand.? Muslims were taught that the
House of Islam and the House of War were separate.? The people of the world could be sharply divided into Muslims and
non-Muslims, and as the Qu?ran says ?There is no God but God?.? By implying the universal and unique nature
of god, and the overriding moral authority of God, Islam provided the impetus
for political unification and centralisation.?
As Muhammad was God?s presence on earth it is easy to see how he was
associated with power.? His perceived
relationship with God aided the construction of a legal system less reliant on
blood feuds and retaliation, as well as legitimising centralised taxation and
control.? Once Islam and the Islamic
state?s power had been created and legitimised successive leaders furthered
centralisation and control.? Sedentary
tribes were given precedence over nomadic ones.? Indeed Nomadism was frowned upon by the Islamic state.? By emphasising the dominance of the
sedentary tribes around Medina, notably the muharijun and the Quraysh, the
state associated power with sedentary, centralised tribes.? Further actions show a desire for the nomads
to settle.? Upon conquest individuals
were only permitted to receive the lucrative ata, or stipend, if they settled:
?the sooner one settles, the sooner one receives the stipend?.? This desire for settlement can surely be
seen as a form of control.? By
encouraging settlement the central authorities encouraged further control.The centralised administrative
structure enabled the Islamic state to organise and fund the conquests.? Traditionally historians viewed the Islamic
conquests as economically driven migrations, but evidence points to a more
organised and strategic movement.? The
first settlers or soldiers that had conquered territories did not bring women,
children and animals with them.? This
implies a stage-by-stage approach to conquest: overpower the occupiers and then
allow controlled migration.? The
interpretation that the Islamic conquests were a collection of random and
eclectic raids is also questionable.? It
can be persuasively argued that the conquests were centrally controlled.? The best example of central directive
authority is Umar?s decision to switch the great Khalid from the Iraqi frontier
to the Syrian frontier.? Donner furthers
these arguments by suggesting that the state had the power to tax and recruit
from all tribes via state run agents.?
He argues that Umar formed conquest parties by instructing his network
of agents to contribute recruits to the Islamic cause.? No historian seems to suggest that the
Muslims had any technological superiority over the great power, and in most
cases they were numerically outnumbered.?
It has been suggested that there were more Arabs fighting for the
Byzantines than there were for the Muslims at Yarmuk.? Similarly, at the decisive battle of Qadisiyya, the Persians,
under the command of Rustam, were numerically superior to the Arabs.? Evidence is sparse and unreliable, but the
way in which the Muslims consistently defeated both empires suggests that in
military terms they must have had some advantage.? Whether this advantage was due to intelligent strategy, religious
fanaticism, a crop of talented generals or better communications is in some
ways irrelevant.? It would be extremely
hard not to suggest that the Arabs had some kind of military advantage.The Byzantine entry into
Ctesiphon in 628 is a false indicator of Byzantine strength.? The Persians were suffering from a series of
internal crisis?s and the Byzantines ultimate victory was largely a result of
Turkish assistance.? Most significantly
the entry into Ctesiphon was the culmination of two decades of damaging warfare
with the Persians.? It was remarkable
that Heraclius managed to raise the necessary resources to launch his
counter-offensive against the Turks.? At
the time the Persians occupied large parts of Palestine and Syria and the imperial
authorities faced a financial crisis.?
The melting down of bronze statues and the removal of plate from
churches highlight the financial plight of the empire.? Similarly the need for Turkish allies shows
us the severe recruitment crisis faced by Heraclius.? Heraclius? remarkable comeback was achieved at a cost.? Generations of civilians in Syria and
Palestine had grown up without imperial rule.?
The populations of these important border lands were alienated from the
empie.? The religious divisions that
plagued the near east can only have intensified this alienation.? Whilst we must not suggest that the division
between Monophytism and imperial orthodoxy encouraged active resistance to the
Byzantines, it cannot have encouraged passionate resistance to Muslim
invaders.? In Egypt however the
religious divisions were more pronounced.?
These divisions, which were inextricably linked with cultural divisions,
created a popular attitude that was ambivalent at best to Byzantine rule.? The situation in Egypt was not helped by the
appointment of the militantly orthodox Cyrus as governor.? The war with Persia had economic and
political effects.? The Byzantines
needed time to recover administrative control over its peoples, as well as time
to recover the economic and military resources that were so depleted during the
Persian wars.Again the lack of evidence makes
it difficult for us to ascertain the precise reasons for Byzantine military
failure, but the apparently large number of Arabs in the Byzantine army shows
us of the recruitment problem.? The
surprise element of the Muslim conquests exemplifies certain Byzantine
weaknesses.? The Byzantines lacked the
intelligence gathering sources to recognise the threat from the Muslims and as
a result had to fight on the Muslim?s terms. In previous wars the Byzantines
used attritional methods to defeat their enemies, but as the disastrous defeat
at Yarmuk suggests the significant early conflicts were large battles.? The Byzantine defences, in relation to the
Arabian desert, were clearly inadequate.?
Much responsibility for the maintenance of city walls was given to city
dwellers, perhaps symptomatic of a lack of imperial control. Residents of the
frontier cities were only too keen to make peace with the Muslims.? It is debatable whether this was due to
cultural and religious differences with the imperial authorities, or to a
rational and pragmatic belief that Muslim rule was the most advantageous way
forward.? Some historians suggest that
the defence in depth policy that necessitated the self-protection of cities
played into the hands of the Muslims.?
The strategy of leaving the elite and mobile forces behind the frontier
was tantamount to letting the Muslims invade the border-lands.? However, it can also be argued that this
policy was also the saviour of the empire.?
These mobile forces were able to restrict the Muslims behind the
Anatolian plateau and thus protect Constantinople. Again the viability of this
argument is largely irrelevant.? The
Roman Empire lacked the resources; the strategy and the military might to
defeat the Muslims.? The dearth of men,
money and close-knit administration was primarily the result of the sapping
Persian war, as well as the cultural and religious divisions that beset the
empire in the 7th century.The Byzantine Empire, in part at
least, survived the 7th century, but by the middle of the 7th
century the Sasanian Empire had been totally destroyed.? The Sasanian Empire had of course
experienced the same debilitating effects of war that the Byzantine Empire
had.? Thus we can say that both empires
were stretched in terms of resources, as well as psychologically
war-weary.? Short-term problems also
afflicted the Sasanians with the floods and plagues of the early to mid 7th
century being the prime examples.? More
long term, structural weaknesses were exposed as a result of the Byzantine
war.? The dynastic rule of the Sasanian
house caused problems in terms of succession.?
It was difficult for new rulers to gain the credibility and respect that
was needed to maintain the support of the independently minded
aristocracy.? The ten different Sasanian
Kings between 628 and 632 bear testament to this problem.? Internal struggles, as in the Roman Empire,
plagued the Sasanian Empire.? Bloody
fights for succession and the Madzakite revolutions of the 5th and 6th
centuries are indicative of an empire with severe political and social
problems.? Again, there is little in the
way of military evidence to explain the chronic poor performance of the
Sasanians.? We can point to lack of
resources and war exhaustion, but at the decisive battle of Qadisiyya Rustam
had a significantly larger force under his command than his Muslim
counterpart.? The loss of this key
battle and the subsequent loss of the capital Ctesiphon highlight another
weakness.? The location of Ctesiphon,
without the protection of strong enough natural or man-made barriers, hastened
the decline of the empire.? The Sasanian
empire, with Ctesiphon acting as a fulcrum for political, military and
administrative activity, survived the death of Peroz in 484 at the hands of the
Hepthalites and the Roman invasion of 627-8, but without Ctesiphon it stood no
chance of defending itself from the Muslims.It is clear than Sasanian and
Roman weaknesses played a significant role in the success of the Islamic
conquests.? Both empires were slowly
recovering from a long and damaging war and we can say with some certainty that
their military status was perilous.?
Both empires were ill-prepared for an attack from the Muslims and as was
often the case in this period the external pressures of the 7th
century intensified existing internal problems.? It would be wrong however to underplay Arab strengths.? The unity of purpose and organizational
power of the Islamic state was remarkable.?
In less than 40 years Muhammad and his successors under the umbrella of
Islam had created a centralised Arabian state capable of defeating both
powers.? The strength of Islam in
creating the state and in providing the ideological underpinning for centralisation
and expansion was extremely significant.?
It is for these reasons that I believe that Arab strengths were more
important than Roman and Persian weaknesses.?
Yes, the position of the great powers was perilous, but the phenomenal
rise of the Islamic state was needed to fully exploit both powers? weaknesses.