Iran Essay, Research Paper
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Politics, Power, and U.S. Policy in Iran, 1950-1953 1
by Francis J. Gavin
On 19 August 1953, elements of the Iranian army, acting on orders from the Shah and
with covert support from the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), deposed Mohammed
Mossadegh as the Prime Minister of Iran. Mossadegh’s overthrow climaxed more than two
years of crisis stemming from Iran’s clash with Great Britain over the nationalization of the
British owned Anglo-Iranian Oil company. Early in the crisis, the United States was
sympathetic to Mossadegh’s nationalization program, and went to great lengths to convince the
British to negotiate a fair settlement with Iran. Throughout 1951 and 1952, the U.S.
government steadfastly refused to sanction any unilateral attempt by Great Britain to end the
crisis through non-diplomatic means. As a result, U.S. participation in the 1953 coup has been
taken as evidence of a dramatic shift in American policy towards Iran.
The historical literature on th
toward Iran as the result of a change in administrations from Truman to Eisenhower. This view
emerges from a widely held belief among diplomatic historians that each president, or at least
each administration, has a distinctive policy of its own. The story is typically one of discontinuity
from administration to administration, based on ideological and personality differences. In the
case of Iran, it is argued that the Eisenhower administration’s mistrust of Third World
nationalism, its sympathy for oil interests and its paranoia toward communism produced a
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This paper emerged from the University of Pennsylvania’s History 700 Seminar. I would like to thank all
the participants, especially Lynn Hunt, for their thoughtful criticisms. I would also like to thank the members
of the Olin Institute at Harvard University, particularly Andrew Erdmann, Colin Kahl, and Darryl Press, for
their suggestions. I am grateful to Kristen Gavin, Robert Kane, Bruce Kuklick, Walter McDougall, John