Welfare Essay, Research Paper
The Aid for Families with Dependent Children program, the
federal welfare funding that provides the most significant chunk of
money to children nationwide, distributes increasing dollars to
unwed mothers and their families. Over the past three decades, the
welfare system has shifted from serving the needs of widows and
their children to providing for vast numbers of young, single
mothers. In light of this transition, it is important to look at
the role the AFDC program plays in promoting the division of
parents, while also considering the impact that the social stigma
welfare carries has on the ability of mothers to get off the move
towards self-sufficiency.
AFDC provides cash assistance for single parents (mothers)
with children with at least one child under the age of 18. Created
by the Social Security Act of 1935 to assist widows the program had
limited appeal. By 1969, increased divorce rates caused divorced
mothers to become the primary users of the AFDC program, while also
providing for a small population of single mothers who were never
married (London). Over the last 30 years, the focus of the program
has shifted once again to focus it’s primary responsibilities
towards single, un-wed mothers and their children.
There are two discernible groups of unwed mothers who collect
welfare payments: divorced mothers and mothers who never married.
Beharov and Sullivan reported that in 1994, 2/3 of the children on
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) were the product of
relationships that never culminated in marriage, while only 30
percent had separated or divorced parents. The other small amount
accounts for the percentage who are children of widows or the
disabled (83). It is interesting to note this percentages while
recognizing that the program began to provide for the needs of
widows and their children, and has become a service that provides
for parents who were never married.
There are few statistics that accurately reflect the entire
population of AFDC mothers. Clearly these women represent a
cross-section of the nations poor. Contrary to the belief that AFDC
recipients are uneducated and of ethnic minorities, studies show
that the population represents a variety of women who have a vast
number of financial, child care and housing needs (London 185).
Single mothers many times carry the entire burden of
responsibility for their children. Though the Family Support Act of
1988 has sought to collect child support from the non-participatory
parent, few single mothers have reaped the benefit of the limited
enforcement of this law (Wilson & Sylvester 34).
Out-of-wedlock childbearing is an increasing sociological
phenomenon. Conservative proponents of the welfare program have
passed supported legislation to limit the cash assistance that can
be provided to unmarried teen-age mothers and their children, and
assumes that this limitation will impact the rate of illegitimacy
and single parenthood (Sandefur B7). The welfare reforms clearly do
not address the issues that create poverty; their misguided attempt
to find a quick solution to the ills created by the nations poor is
void of an understanding of some basic issues related to women’s
dependence on welfare. First, lawmakers assume that the welfare
state creates the problem of out-of-wedlock pregnancies by providing
support. Un-wed mothers often reflect sociological and societal
concerns, and a focus on efforts to promote education, provide birth
control and support esteem building programs would benefit the
system more than the limitations set in welfare reforms (Sandefur
B7).
Studies of a number of foreign countries in Western Europe
offer insight into the changes necessary in the U.S. and their
impact. The presupposition that single motherhood directly
corresponds with welfare funding is a misguided conclusion. In both
the Netherlands and Germany, welfare programs provide more complete
and comprehensive welfare packages for their unwed parents and
children. But these programs have not acted as support for
increases in single-parent births. Instead, both of these countries
have far fewer unmar
U.S. (Sandefur B7). But the AFDC program by design presents
concerns for low-income parents and often encourages parents not to
marry due to the constraints of the program. Though called Aid for
Families with Dependent Children, the program does not support the
notion of the nuclear family. Instead, the program only provides
for children of single parents, or families with at least one
disabled parent. So while many single mothers might chose to marry
their child’s father, the loss of their support through AFDC might
make this financially impossible.
Federal legislators focus on the impact that marriage could
have on rescuing the constantly struggling welfare system. The call
for a return to family values has pushed the buttons of many
feminists who hope to relieve women of their financial
interdependency on men. But many consider marriage the primary
source of economic security for women and the best escape from
welfare (Besharov & Sullivan 81). Encouraging marital unions may
become a primary focus towards directing single mothers away from
welfare.
It is interesting to note the significance of marriage in the
solution of welfare dependency in light of welfare laws that
discourage it. The finical penalties for low income parents who
marry almost poisons many of the nation’s poor away from the
institution (Besharov & Sullivan 81). It is also clear to see that
welfare packages, while discouraging marriage, also provide a
disappointing look at the wage situation in the U.S. Many
recipients cannot afford to make the transition from aid to work
because of the effect that this change would have on their income.
Many welfare recipient families with two children nationwide receive
over $12,000 in cash, food stamps and Medicaid benefits, as well as
up to $5,000 in paid housing (Besharov & Sullivan). Figures like
these out compete wage earners re-entering the work force. The
current push towards a working minimum wage will have a direct
impact on whether welfare mothers chose to enter job training
programs or remain within the programs. It is discouraging to note
that many recipients would like to work, but clearly cannot
relinquish their aid for jobs that pay little more than $5.00/hour.
The stigma attached receiving AFDC clearly reeks havoc on the
self-esteem of women who hope to re-enter the work force. Many
employers perceive recipients of public assistance programs as
deviant and lazy. These preconceived notions discredit the status
of workers and increase the cycle of despair that leads many to
return from jobs to AFDC. Resent research support the theory that
most AFDC recipient utilize the program during short term
difficulties, and few depend on the program for long-term care
(Harris 406). Focusing on this as a starting point, it is clear
that the solution to welfare reform comes from a movement towards
jobs. Though many women support the responsibility of fathers and
hope that the Family Support Act will help them receive help with
their children, few depend on the enforcement of this law. Instead,
the focus of women, both within the system and in the work force,
must be on training, educating, and hiring former AFDC recipients to
promote a new independence (Harris 407).
Works Cited
Besharov, D. & Sullivan, T. “Welfare Reform and Marriage,” Public
Interest, (1996) : Fall, pp. 81-94.
Harris, Kathleen. “Life After Welfare: Women, Work and Repeat
Dependency,” American Sociological Review, (1996) : June,
pp. 405-426.
Jarrett, Robin. “Welfare Stigma Among Low-Income, African American
Single Mothers,” Family Relations, (1996) : October, pp. 368-
374.
London, Rebecca. “The Difference Between Divorced and Never-Married
Mothers’ Participation in the Aid for Families with Dependent
Children Program,” Journal of Family Issues, (1996): March,
pp. 170-185.
Sandefur, Gary. “Welfare Doesn’t Cause Illegitimacy and Single
Parenthood,” Chronicle of Higher Education, (1996): October,
pp. B7-B8.
Wilson, J. & Sylvester, K. “No More Home Alone,” Policy Review,
(1996):
March, pp. 34-39.